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THE FIRST AMENDMENT "LAW
OF BILLBOARDS"
The Supreme Court frequently has faced the task of establishing first
amendment' parameters that protect different media of expression.'
Recognizing that each medium demands individual consideration with
respect to the determination of its sphere of first amendment protec-
tion, the Court has promulgated a separate body of first amendment
law applicable to each mode of communication.' In Metromedia, Inc.
1. The first amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981). See, e.g., Con-
solidated Edison Co. v. Pub, Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (invalidating as an
unjustified subject matter restriction a New York Public Service Commission order
prohibiting public utility companies from including controversial inserts in monthly
billings); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (invalidating as a subject matter restric-
tion an Illinois statute that prohibited picketing of residences or dwellings, while it ex-
empted peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute);
Shamburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (invalidating a village ordi-
nance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations
that did not use at least 75% of their receipts for charitable purposes as unconstitution-
ally overbroad because the purported governmental interests in preventing fraud, pro-
tecting public safety and ensuring residential privacy could be sufficiently served by less
drastic limitations); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding military post regu-
lations that permitted civilian access to designated areas but banned speeches and dem-
onstrations of a partisan political nature and required prior post headquarter's approval
of literature distribution because civilians have no generalized constitutional right to
make political speeches or distribute leaflets on a military base); Ernoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (invalidating a city ordinance as unjustified content
censorship that punished a drive-in movie theatre for exhibiting nudity when the screen
is visible from a public street or place); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974) (upholding a municipal policy of not permitting political advertising on city
transit system vehicles, while allowing other types of advertising; space on a city vehicle
is not first amendment forum, but rather is a commercial venture not required to accept
every advertising offer).
3. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 452 U.S. 490, 501 (1981). See, e.g., FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (broadcasting has the most limited first
amendment protection of all communication forums because of its uniquely pervasive
presence in people's lives); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 446, 557-
58 (1975) (although each medium of expression must be assessed for first amendment
purposes by standards suited to it, the nature of a theater does not necessitate the appli-
cation of a standard drastically different from that applied to other forms of expression
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v. San Diego,4 the Court addressed the freedom of expression issue in
the context of billboard regulation for the first time' and purported to
that make freedom of expression the rule); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 502-03 (1952) (expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free
speech and press guarantee of the first and fourteenth amendments, and although mo-
tion pictures are not necessarily subject to the precise rules governing other methods of
communication, basic first amendment principles do not vary); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (each method of communication is a law
unto itself; freedom of speech does not include the freedom to use sound amplifiers
attached to moving vehicles to drown out the natural speech of others).
4. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
5. Although the Court previously had considered attacks on the constitutional va-
lidity of certain billboard regulations, Metromedia was the first billboard regulation case
the Court decided on first amendment grounds. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 498. See also
Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (validating a state statute forbidding the
advertisement of tobacco products on billboards under equal protection, due process
and commerce clause attacks); St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S.
269, 273-74 (1919) (validating a city ordinance regulating the size and placement of
billboards over objections of unconstitutional limitations of individual liberty and of
property rights in land; holding that billboards may be prohibited in residential city
districts in the interest of safety, morality, health and community decency); Thomas
Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529 (1917) (validating a city ordinance
prohibiting billboards in residential districts challenged on equal protection grounds).
Cusack is an amusing example of the extreme a court will go to accept evidence pro-
duced at trial to substantiate the city's implementation of its police power to regulate
billboards. The court relied on evidence of an accumulation of combustible material
around billboards, offensive and unsanitary accumulations around billboards and evi-
dence that billboards provide a convenient shield for immoral practices. See id. at 529.
Interestingly, in the early days of the automobile, the outdoor advertising industry
sufficiently regulated itself to quiet public disfavor over the effect of billboard advertis-
ing on landscape. See F. PRESBREY, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADVER-
TISING, 504-05 (1929) (noting the industry's concern for aesthetics and traffic safety).
After governmental regulation replaced industry self-regulation, commentators and leg-
islators felt confident that billboard regulation legislatively imposed could not fall to
first amendment attack, at least with respect to commercial advertising. See, e.g.,
HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, BULLETIN No. 337, CONTROL OF ROADSIDE ADVERTISING ALONG
THE INTERSTATE SYSTEM, 28-29 (1962):
When one reviews the cases interpreting the scope of the First Amendment, it is
apparent that its application to protection of commercial advertising is a novel
suggestion ....
Although the question of how far commercial advertising when viewed as a me-
dium of communication may clear a preferred position under the constitution is...
still unresolved . . . , there is little doubt as to the question of how far billboard
advertising as a form of private commercial business may claim this advantage.
The answer is 'not at all' . . ..
[I]t is very late in the day to be told now that commercial billboard advertising
embodies the characteristics of communication and performs communicative func-
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establish the "law of billboards."6
In establishing the law of billboards, the Metromedia plurality set
out numerous restrictions on municipal power to regulate billboard ad-
vertising.7 The continuing validity of those restrictions, however, is
questionable because the majority8 of the Metromedia Court did not
reach a consensus on the issues presented. Recently, in Members of the
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent,9 the Court partially clarified the
Metromedia holding by reaffirming local governments' authority to
regulate outdoor advertising to curb visual blight.'I Despite this clari-
fication, however, the vitality of many principles the Metromedia plu-
rality established remains in doubt.
The purpose of this Recent Development is to examine first amend-
ment principles as they apply to billboard regulations with Metromedia
and Taxpayers for Vincent as focal points. This article also will survey
and compare post-Metromedia lower court decisions to determine the
force and effect of the Metromedia decision.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES BILLBOARD
REGULATIONS RAISE
Billboards, like other modes of communication, have noncommuni-
cative characteristics and communicative capabilities, which both are
susceptible to government regulation.'1 Although the first amendment
tions to such a great extent that it may be regulated as to form, location, and
structural features without violating the First Amendment.
Id. See also C. FLOYD AND P. SHEDD, HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION: THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL MOVEMENT'S GREATEST FAILURE 50-54 (1979) (first amendment's provi-
sions generally do not protect outdoor advertising). For a discussion of pre-Metromedia
lower court decisions dealing with freedom of speech and billboard regulation, see An-
not., 81 A.L.R. 3d, 486, § 8 (1977)
6. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 501. This expression is borrowed from the plurality's
author, Justice White.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 53-66.
8. See infra note 67.
9. 104 S. Ct. 2188 (1984).
10. Id. at 2130.
11. For an artist's perspective of the noncommunicative aspect of billboards, see P.
BLAKE, GOD'S OWN JUNKYARD 27 (2d ed. 1979). The author wrote:
When people talk about the flood of ugliness engulfing America, they think first
of billboards-and, more specifically, of the billboards that line our highways and
dot our landscape.
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protects both mediums of expression against undue regulation, 2 the
applicable first amendment analysis is different for each. Thus, the
Court has developed a body of first amendment law regulating time,
place and manner restrictions,13 while also establishing a separate body
of first amendment law limiting the regulation of the subject matter of
protected expressions.14
A. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
The first amendment guarantees persons freedom of expression.
Courts, however, have held that this guarantee does not provide indi-
viduals with the right to communicate at all times, places and man-
ners.15 Rather, communicative activities are subject to reasonable' 6
The problem was stated rather succinctly by Ogden Nash:
I think that I shall never see
A billboard lovely as a tree,
Perhaps unless the billboard fall,
I'll never see a tree at all.
Id. For a judicial perspective of the particularly "intrusive" nature of billboards see
State v. Packer Corp., 77 Utah 500, 515, 297 P. 1013, 1019 (1931). The Court stated:
Billboards ... placards and such are in a class by themselves .... Advertise-
ments of this sort are constantly before the eyes of observers on the streets: to be
seen without the exercise of choice or volition on their own part. Other forms of
advertising are ordinarily seen as a matter of choice on the part of the observer.
The young people as well as the adults have the message of the billboard thrust
upon them by all arts and devices that skill can produce.
Id.
12. Note that restrictions on noncommunicative aspects of a forum necessarily re-
strict the forum's communicative aspect to some extent. Therefore, some degree of first
amendment protection arises even with respect to noncommunicative restrictions. Me-
tromedia, 453 U.S. at 502. See also Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (laws regulating time, place or manner of speech stand on a
different footing from laws prohibiting speech altogether, but a regulation leaving the
speaker with a less than a satisfactory forum of expression violates the first
amendment).
13. See infra notes 16-20, 29-30 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text. See also Consolidated Edison Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 417 U.S. 530, 535 (1980): "We must determine whether the
prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction, (ii) a permissible sub-
ject matter regulation, or (iii) a narrowly tailored means of serving a compelling state
interest." Id.
15. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an anti-
noise ordinance that prohibited wilful diversion of classroom activities while schools are
in session); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (upholding a trespass statute
that prevented demonstrators from entering jail premises); Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1953) (upholding a city ordinance that prohibited religious serv-
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time, place and manner restrictions. These restrictions must serve both
a significant governmental interest 17 and permit alternative modes of
expression.18 Constitutional time, place and manner restrictions may
not be based on the content or subject matter of speech.19 This con-
tent-neutral requirement extends to prohibiting public expression of an
ices held in public parks without a license; construed as leaving licensing officials no
discretion as to the granting of licenses); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 558
(1965) (recognizing the validity of time, place and manner restrictions, but holding un-
constitutional an obstructing public passages statute as applied discriminatorily against
civil rights demonstrators); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding city ordi-
nance that prohibited sound trucks).
16. Reasonableness in this context means no greater restriction than is essential to
further an important or substantial governmental interest. See United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (upholding a federal criminal statute that prohibited know-
ing mutilation of a draft card). The Court stated:
[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms .... [A]
governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is in the constitutional power of
the Government.
Id.
17. In determining the validity of an asserted governmental objective, the attributes
of the particular regulated forum are an important consideration because the signifi-
cance of the stated interest is analyzed with respect to the forum's nature and function.
Thus, a governmental objective to maintain the orderly movement of crowds for the
safety and convenience of fairgoers is valid as to a fairgrounds regulation prohibiting the
sale or distribution of printed material, except from a duly licensed location, because the
asserted objective is sufficiently important in light of the peculiar fairgrounds crowd
control problems. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640, 650-51 (1981).
18. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980).
The Court declared: "Thus, the essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the
recognition that various methods of speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate
legitimate governmental goals." Id. See also Linmark Assoc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (striking down a township ordinance prohibiting the
posting of real estate "For Sale" signs because the ordinance did not leave ample alter-
native means of expression; ordinance was not content-neutral); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (striking
down a state statute declaring the advertisement of the prices of prescription drugs to be
unprofessional conduct and holding the statute to exceed the bounds of time, place and
manner restrictions because the statute was not content-neutral).
19. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536. See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 470 (1980); Ernoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Papish v.
Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam) (striking down a state univer-
sity bylaw prohibiting on campus distribution of publications containing indecent
speech); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (striking down an ordinance
prohibiting peaceful picketing at schools).
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entire topic as well as restrictions on particular viewpoints. 20
B. Regulations Based on Subject Matter
First amendment analysis of government regulations based on a par-
ticular subject matter varies according to the type of expression re-
stricted. The first amendment affords commercial speech21 less
protection than other protected expressions.22 Thus, separate tests
20. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537 (rejecting the Public Service Commission's
argument that its regulation prohibiting bill inserts that discuss nuclear power was con-
tent-neutral because it applied to all discussion of nuclear power).
21. The Supreme Court has defined commercial speech as expression proposing a
commercial transaction and related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561-62 (1980) (regulation banning an electric utility from advertising to promote
the use of electricity is a regulation of commercial speech); Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 11 (1979) (optometrists' use of trade names is commercial speech because it is
used as part of a proposed commercial transaction); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
363-64 (1977) (disciplinary rule prohibiting attorneys from advertising in newspapers or
other media is regulation of commercial speech); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (regulation of the advertisement
of prescription drugs prices is regulation of commercial speech). Thus, an advertise-
ment for, or sale of, an activity which itself is protected by the first amendment and
therefore not solely related to economic interests, is not within the scope of commercial
speech. See, eg., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (commercial aspects of a
paid advertisement held not in itself to negate all first amendment guarantees); Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973)
(speech is not rendered commercial because it relates to an advertisement); Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966) (profit from the sales of allegedly obscene publi-
cation given no weight in considering the first amendment protection afforded such pub-
lication); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (alleged libelous
statements published as part of a paid advertisement held not to have forfeited first
amendment protection when published in that form); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (the sale of religious literature held not to convert evangelism into
a commercial enterprise); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (inclusion of an
advertisement for the sale of a religious book held not to move down prohibition distri-
bution of handbill). See also Note, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Adver-
tising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHi. L. REV., 205, 234-36 (1976): "To
treat such advertising as commercial speech would inhibit the rights of publishers and
authors to distribute their works and the rights of various organizations to recruit mem-
bers, solicit funds, and publicize their ideas." Id. at 236. See also Jackson & Jeffries,
Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV.
1, 3 8-39 (1979) (noting the justifiable limitation of first amendment protection afforded
commercial speech to truthful and legitimate commercial information even though such
a limitation for noncommercial expression would be invalid; the core evil the first
amendment seeks to avoid is official determination of the truth or falseness of political
opinion).
22. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). See also Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978) (regulation of in-person solicitation by a lawyer
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have evolved for determining the validity of content-based regulations
of commercial and noncommercial speech.23
When ruling on content-based regulations of protected noncommer-
cial speech, the Supreme Court consistently has held that any regula-
tion based on the speech's subject matter or content violates both the
first amendment and the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause.24 In cases dealing with content-based regulations of protected
commercial speech, however, the Court has taken a less rigid stance,
invokes a lower level of judicial scrutiny); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)
(application of the overbreadth doctrine is necessary in the context of the regulation of
commercial speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 69 n.32 (1976)
(content of communication governs extent of constitutional protection of commercial
speech; distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech permits regulation
of commercial speech that would be unconstitutional if applied to noncommercial
speech).
Prior to 1975, commercial advertising, whether or not incorporated with expressions
of possible public interests, was afforded no first amendment protection. See Valentine
v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (handbill advertising boat for charter and containing
a protest against city agency held unprotected speech). In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975), the Court, without overruling Valentine, held that advertising is not neces-
sarily denied first amendment protection merely because it has commercial aspects or
reflects the advertiser's commercial interests. The Court reaffirmed and strengthened
commercial speech protection in Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85 (1977) (recognizing the importance of the free flow of commercial information in
making significant economic decisions). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 783 (1978) (informational function of advertising forms the basis for first amend-
ment protection of commercial speech).
23. Not all noncommercial communications fall within the protective sphere of the
first amendment. Unprotected messages are those which "are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighted by the social interest in order and
morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words
likely to provoke the average person to retaliation not protected). See also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (media defamation of private persons not pro-
tected even when an issue of public interest is involved); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973) (obscene material that is patently offensive not protected); Schenk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (Congress has power to prevent expressions that create a
clear and present danger of harm).
24. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 405 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972): The Court stated:
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-
fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any
thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censor-
ship is content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content
would completely undercut the 'profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.' . ..
Necessarily, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amend-
ment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it
finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favorable or more
1986]
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upholding such regulations under specified conditions.25
In Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,2 6 the Court established the prevailing constitutional test for deter-
mining the validity of content-based regulation of commercial speech.
Under the test, a regulation is valid if: (a) the restricted communica-
tion is either misleading or related to unlawful activity; or (b)(1) the
government asserts a substantial interest, (2) the restriction directly ad-
vances the state interest involved,27 and (3) the restriction imposed is
the least restrictive means of accomplishing the asserted goal.28
C. Total Prohibitions
A total ban upon a forum of protected expression is the most restric-
tive means for accomplishing an asserted government goal and is, by
definition, content-neutral. Because such a ban represents the most ex-
treme version of time, place or manner restrictions, it is subject to rigid
judicial analysis. Thus, a regulation totally prohibiting a method of
communication will be held invalid unless it is the only method by
which the government can accomplish a substantial governmental in-
terest29 and the remaining modes of expression meet the communica-
controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in public facilities.
Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). See also Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-63 (1980) (invalidating content-based picketing prohibi-
tion). For cases and commentaries on the first amendment equal protection intersec-
tion, see Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 n.3.
25. See supra notes 21-22 (cases cited).
26. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
27. Id. at 564. A regulation ineffective or only remotely supportive of a stated pur-
pose is invalid. Id.
28. Id. at 564-66. See also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (invalidating state
regulation of attorneys soliciting for nonmisleading expressions). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 580 (1978) (discussing govern-
mental interference with first amendment communicative and noncommunicative
rights); Stone, Restrictions on Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Sub-
ject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CH. L. REv. 81, 82 (1978) (pre-Central Hudson Gas
article discussing the confusion in the law with respect to content-based, but viewpoint-
neutral, regulations).
29. See, eg, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (invalidating
a zoning ordinance forbidding live entertainment in commercial zones). See also Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking down a municipal ordinance forbid-
ding door-to-door distribution of handbills as an unnecessarily restrictive means of pro-
tecting households from annoyances); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (total
ban of right to distribute handbills held unconstitutional because the public has a consti-
tutional right to express views in an orderly fashion on a public street); Schneider v.
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tive needs of all speakers affected by the prohibition."0
D. The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
A substantial barrier to comprehensive constitutional review of liti-
gation involving restriction of freedom of expression lies in the general
justiciability requirement that a litigant may only assert his own consti-
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (ordinance's purported purpose of keeping streets clean held
insufficient to justify forbidding circulation of handbills on public streets because less
restrictive methods were available); Hague v. Commission for Ind. Org., 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (ordinances forbidding the distribution of printed matter on streets and public
places without a permit held invalid as an arbitrary suppression of an undeniable consti-
tutional right). But see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949) (upholding prohi-
bition of sound trucks even though they are the most economical means to
communicate).
30. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1335-36 (1970). Professor Ely stated:
On . . . occasions neutrality with regard to expressive conduct is not good
enough. Sometimes the government is affirmatively obligated to deviate from its
policy respecting similar nonexpressive conduct in order to accommodate expres-
sion. For example, the state's interest in keeping the streets and sidewalks clean
cannot constitutionally be served by outlawing the distribution of handbills. Here,
neutrality-in absence of any special restrictions on expression-is not good
enough. The state is obligated to protect the channels of communication, even if it
takes a special exception and some sacrifice of the state's expression-unconnected
interest in clean cities to do it. That there must be some such affirmative obliga-
tions is clear. Were the constitutional requirement simply one of neutrality toward
expressive conduct, channels of communication such as pamphleteering, picketing
and public speaking could effectively be closed altogether, given the state's undeni-
able interest in keeping thoroughfares clear, and controlling crowds, noise and lit-
ter. It is difficult to determine what factors lead the court to say in a given context
that neutrality will not suffice, that the means of expression in issue simply must be
respected. A review of the results reached in the relevant cases suggests, however,
that the controlling inquiries are the importance of the interest the state is pursu-
ing, the extent to which that interest could be served by less inhibiting regulations,
and the existence of alternative means of communicating with the same audience
with approximately equal effectiveness.
Once again the relevance of motivation must be a function of the judge's view of
the scope of the First Amendment. That is, he first must decide whether in the
context presented the state need only refrain from comparatively disfavoring ex-
pressive conduct, or whether it simply must keep the channel of communication
open-even if it takes a special deviation from some broader policy to do it. If in
his opinion neutrality is enough, anti-expression motivation is relevant. But if neu-
trality is not enough, motivation is beside the point; he need only ask whether the
medium involved has been given the accomodation he feels is requisite.
Id. This reasoning may explain the distinction between Kovacs, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), and
the intimations of the Metromedia plurality that a total ban of billboards would be
invalid. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
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tutional rights.31 A litigant may not challenge the constitutionality of
a statute because the statute could be applied unconstitutionally to
others in dissimilar factual circumstances.32 Thus, a litigant may not
normally challenge legislation as facially invalid, but only can chal-
lenge its validity by alleging it impinges on his constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized a limited exception to
this rigid standing requirement,3 3 referred to as the overbreadth doc-
trine. This exception applies to first amendment controversies. 34
31. See, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943); see generally H. HART & H.
WVECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 150-241 (2d ed. 1973)
(evolution of standing requirement).
32. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601, 610 (1973); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Ashwander v.
TWA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis J., concurring). The overbreadth doctrine is
supported by our constitutional system in which "courts are not roving commissions
assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at
610-11. See infra note 53.
33. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1972) (granting a married
man standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons that were denied access to con-
traceptives by a Massachusetts statute making it a criminal offense to distribute contra-
ceptives to unmarried persons, because unmarried persons' ability to obtain
contraceptives would be materially impaired by enforcement of the statute); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958) (an organization has standing to assert the con-
stitutional right of its members to be protected from being compelled by the state to
reveal their affiliation with the organization because "[t]o require that [the right] be
claimed by the members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very
moment of its assertion"). See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975). The
Court stressed the limited application of the doctrine: "Declaring a statute facially un-
constitutional because of overbreadth 'is, manifestly strong medicine,' and 'has been
employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.'" Id. (citing Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
34. The Court, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973), explained
the reasoning for a first amendment exception:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space
and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment
rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment
that a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of
society. As a corollary, the Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to
permit-in the First Amendment area-'attacks on the overly broad statute with
no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own con-
duct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specific-
ity.' 'Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their
own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or
assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.'
Id. (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
See also Bates 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977) (first amendment interests are fragile in the
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Under the first amendment overbreadth doctrine, when a statute reg-
ulates speech and the reviewing court is unable to construe the statute
to avoid addressing constitutional issues other than those a plaintiff has
standing to raise in his own right,35 the plaintiff may attack the statute
as being broader in scope than necessary or permissible under first
amendment principles without demonstrating that the relief sought
will vindicate his own constitutional right to engage in protected con-
duct.36 To invoke the doctrine, the person asserting the rights of third
persons must show either specific and present objective harm, or a
threat of specific future harm.3 7 In addition, the Court has held the
sense that an overbroad statute may chill protected speech with its in terrorem effect
inhibiting challenge by a protected speaker); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 12-24 (stating that the deterrent effect of regulating protected speech is not effec-
tively removed if the permissible scope of the regulation would have to be decided on a
case by case basis by plaintiffs willing to risk the penalty attached to statutory
violations).
35. For example, if the California Supreme Court had construed the San Diego
ordinance in Metromedia as inapplicable to noncommercial speech, the Court could
have avoided analysis in those terms and the ordinance would have passed constitu-
tional muster. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 494 n.2 (1981).
Of course, the Court must accept the state court's construction of state legislation. See
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
36. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815-16 (1975) (granting standing to
the managing editor of a newspaper convicted of violating a Virginia statute making it a
misdemeanor to encourage or prompt, by the sale or circulation of any publication, the
processing of an abortion, to assert the first amendment rights of noncommercial adver-
tisers not subject to the statute); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972)
(allowing plaintiff who claimed no infliction of harm, to challenge an anti-noise ordi-
nance as overbroad because such laws deter privileged activity); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972) (allowing standing for a person convicted of violating a Georgia
statute prohibiting the utterance of provocative words, though convicted for having ut-
tered allegedly constitutionally unprotected "fighting" words); Coates v. City of Cincin-
nati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (allowing an overbreadth challenge to a city ordinance
making it a criminal offense for "three or more persons to assemble.., on any of the
sidewalks... and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by
.. "); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (allowing civil rights organiza-
tion and its executive director to sue for injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of an-
tisubversive activity statutes allegedly designed to inhibit its members' right to free
expression, some of whom had been arrested and convicted thereunder); Baggett v. Bul-
litt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 (1964) (allowing members of the faculty, staff and students of the
University of Washington to sue to enjoin enforcement of state statute requiring teach-
ers and all other state employees to take an oath as a condition of employment);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) (allowing an organization to assert first
amendment rights of its members to remain anonymous).
37. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816-17 (1975); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,
13-14 (1972).
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doctrine inapplicable in the commercial context of professional adver-
tising.38 The Supreme Court discussed these first amendment princi-
ples in Metromedia, its only 39 case concerning billboard regulations.
II. METROMEDIA: THE LAW OF BILLBOARDS
In Metromedia, outdoor advertising companies4' in San Diego
sought to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance that imposed restric-
tions on the use and location of permanent advertising structures. 41 In
the past, purchasers had used the advertising space to convey both
commercial and noncommercial messages.42
The San Diego ordinance 43 generally prohibited off-site," outdoor
38. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Court stated that:
[Tihere are 'common sense differences,' between commercial speech and other
varieties .... Since advertising is linked to commercial well being, it seems un-
likely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad
regulation .... Moreover, concerns for uncertainty in determining the scope of
protection are reduced; the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a
product or service that he provides, and presumably he can determine more readily
than others whether his speech is truthful and protected .... Since overbreadth
has been described by this court as 'strong medicine,' which 'has been employed
... sparingly and only as a last resort,'... we decline to apply it to professional
advertising, a context where it is not necessary to further its intended objective.
Id. at 380-81 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 421 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
39. Although Metromedia represents the first billboard regulation-first amendment
controversy the Court resolved on the merits, several cases were appealed to the Court
but dismissed summarily on one ground or another. See Lotze v. Washington, 444 U.S.
921 (1979) (did not raise a substantial federal question on appeal from a judgment re-
jecting first amendment challenge of a billboard ordinance that allowed on-site commer-
cial but not noncommercial billboard advertising); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjellc, 440
U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978) (did not
present a substantial federal question, thereby rejecting the proposition that prohibiting
off-site commercial advertising violates the first amendment); Markham Advertising
Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316 (1969) (statutes prohibiting billboards in specified ar-
eas and included on-site/off-site distinctions). See also Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 498-
500. Relying on these decisions, the California Supreme Court found the San Diego
ordinance constitutional. The Supreme Court maintained the propriety of such reli-
ance, but reserved its right to disregard any precedential significance of the prior sum-
mary dismissals, especially Lotze, and proceeded to find the San Diego ordinance
facially invalid. Id. at 521.
40. The outdoor advertising companies were successful both at the trial and in the
California Court of Appeals. The California Supreme Court, however, reversed, re-
jecting appellants' argument that the San Diego ordinance was facially invalid under the
first amendment. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 497.
41. Id. at 493-96.
42. Id. at 496.
43. Id. at 493 n.I.
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advertising display signs45 subject to certain exceptions. The excep-
tions included signs: (1) conveying enumerated commercial and non-
commercial messages;46 and (2) business signs not visible from any
point on the boundary of the premises.47 Additionally, the ordinance
restricted on-site billboard messages to: (1) designating the owner of
the premises to which the sign was attached; (2) identifying the prem-
ise; and (3) identifying the goods produced or services rendered on the
premises.48
The San Diego ordinance raised numerous first amendment con-
cerns. First, because the billboard companies challenged the ordinance
as to its effect on the free flow of both noncommercial and commercial
information, the issue of their standing to assert the rights of potential
noncommercial speakers arose.49 Second, the general off-site advertis-
ing prohibition arguably represented a total prohibition of outdoor ad-
vertising, the most extreme version of time, place and manner
restrictions."° Because the city framed the statutory exemptions in
terms of the proposed message of conveyance, however, the ordinance
placed the off-site prohibition outside the sphere of time, place or man-
ner restrictions and within the sphere of content-based regulations. Be-
cause the exemptions permitted only specified commercial and
noncommercial messages, the ordinance could be interpreted as a con-
tent-based regulation of both commercial and noncommercial speech. 51
The final first amendment concern was that the ordinance arguably
discriminated against noncommercial speech by permitting some
commercial messages, but prohibiting all noncommercial
communications. 52
44. Off-site signs are unattached to the premises of the advertising purchaser. Id. at
493 n. 1.
45. Noting the constitutional difficulties of applying the ordinance's general prohibi-
tion to other media of expression, the California Supreme Court construed "advertising
display signs" to include only permanent advertising structures. See id. at 494 n.2.
46. For instance, signs exempt from the ordinance included those used to perform
governmental functions, signs used to convey religious messages or holiday greetings,
and public service signs limited to the depiction of time, temperature, or news were
exempt. See id. at 495 n.3.
47. See id. at 495 n.3.
48. See id. at 493 n.1.
49, Id. at 504.
50. Id. at 515 n.20, 525 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 516-17 (Brennan J., concurring).
52 Id. at 503. The plurality summarized the ordinance:
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The Metromedia plurality established six guidelines for review of
billboard regulations. First, outdoor advertising companies whose off-
site billboards convey a substantial amount of noncommercial advertis-
ing have standing to assert the first amendment rights of
noncommercial speakers, both as to on-site and off-site regulations,
notwithstanding the billboard owner's purely commercial interest in
making the challenge.5 3 The plurality, however, left the parameters of
"substantial amount of noncommercial advertising" undefined.54
Second, a court must analyze the restrictive effect a content-based
regulation has on commercial and noncommercial speech separately
Thus, under the ordinance (1) a sign advertising goods or services available on
the property where the sign is located is allowed; (2) a sign on a building or other
property advertising goods or services produced or offered elsewhere is barred;
(3) noncommercial advertising, unless within one of the specific exceptions, is
everywhere prohibited. The occupant of property may advertise his own goods or
services; he may not advertise the goods or services of others, nor may he display
most noncommercial messages.
Id.
Because the ordinance contained a severability clause, the Court remanded the case,
thereby leaving state courts to determine the meaning and application of the clause. Id.
at 521 n.26. On remand, the California Supreme Court determined that construing the
statute so that it prohibits only commercial signs, as dictated by the Metromedia deci-
sion, would be inconsistent with the ordinance's language and with the underlying legis-
lative intent. Therefore, the court held that severance was impossible. Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 32 Cal. 3d 180, 190, 185 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266, 649 P.2d 902,
908 (1982). As a final backhanded comment, the California court held that an ordi-
nance framed in the terms prescribed in Metromedia would require the city to police the
content of advertising messages and would compel the city to distinguish between com-
mercial and noncommercial speech, "an extremely difficult task, and one which presents
serious constitutional problems." See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
at 536-40. See infra note 67 for a discussion of the Metromedia concurring and dissent-
ing opinions.
53. 453 U.S. at 504. The plurality stated that appellants may challenge the prohibi-
tion of both off-site commercial and noncommercial advertising under the auspices of
the overbreadth doctrine. Note, however, that part V of the Metromedia opinion ad-
dressed the validity of content-based regulation of on-site advertising even though ap-
pellants made no showing that they own on-site signs or, perhaps more significantly,
that on-site signs had been used to convey a substantial amount of noncommercial
messages. Apparently, then, a billboard owner who can show that any of his signs are
used to a substantial degree for noncommercial expression has standing to challenge all
aspects of billboard regulations affecting his business. See intfra note 67 for a discussion
of Justice Stevens' dissent, in which he found no standing to challenge the ordinance as
applied to on-site signs.
54. The plurality cited no figures to support their finding that appellants rented
billboard space in a sufficiently substantial amount to noncommercial speakers. See
Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 496, 504.
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and in terms of the standards applicable to each type of speech.55
Third, a regulation generally prohibiting off-site billboard advertis-
ing, but exempting certain commercial and noncommercial messages,
is not content-neutral and, therefore, is not a time, place or manner
restriction.56 Similarly, a restriction limiting permissible on-site com-
munications is content-based and, therefore, a court must analyze indi-
vidually the regulation's effect on commercial and noncommercial
speech.
57
Fourth, under the Central Hudson Gas test,58 if the goals of a gen-
eral prohibition of off-site commercial advertising are traffic safety and
aesthetic enhancement, the regulation is valid absent a showing of in-
tent to suppress speech.5 9 Courts have judicially noticed6° that traffic
safety and aesthetics are sufficient justifications for statutory prohibi-
tion of billboard advertising. 61 A general prohibition of off-site com-
mercial advertising is not overbroad because it permits other
advertising.
62
Fifth, relying on Central Hudson Gas, the Court ruled that an ordi-
nance generally prohibiting off-site commercial advertising, but al-
lowing on-site commercial advertising is valid.63 This rule applies even
if the regulation limits the scope of permissible, on-site commercial
communication to specified messages, as long as there is some reason-
able commercial or public basis for discrimination in favor of the enu-
55. Id. at 504-05.
56. Id. at 516-17.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 26-28 and accompanying text.
59. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-12.
60. Id. at 508-10. Judicial notice of traffic safety and aesthetic interests means that
the government is not required to empirically show that the statute furthers the govern-
mental interests.
61. Id. at 508. Although judicial notice provides an acceptable justification to a
billboard regulation, a total prohibition is not necessarily valid because it might leave
affected speakers with inadequate means of expression. See supra note 18 and accompa-
nying text.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 510-12. The Court viewed the on-site/off-site distinction and the permis-
sible enumeration of allowable commercial communications as the city's resolution of
the conflict between its land use interests and the commercial advertising interests of
sellers of services and goods. Finding the distinctions to be in line with the furtherance
of the city's asserted goals, the Court felt obligated to leave the appropriate resolution of
the conflict to the local authority.
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merated communications.6 4
Sixth, whenever commercial billboard communication is permissible,
the government may not prohibit noncommercial expression." Fur-
thermore, whenever billboard communication is permissible, the gov-
ernment may not determine the permissible topics of noncommercial
communication, notwithstanding that the noncommercial communica-
tion might be viewpoint neutral.
66
Although the Metromedia plurality67 established these six guidelines
64. Id.
65. Id. at 512-17.
66. Id.
67. In Metromedia, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, reached a result
concurring with the plurality, but based on substantially different grounds. They con-
strued the San Diego ordinance as a total prohibition on billboard advertising and pro-
posed the rule that a city may totally ban billboards if it can show that a sufficiently
substantial governmental interest is directly furthered by the total ban and that any-
thing less than a total ban would promote the achievement of that goal less effectively.
See 453 U.S. at 525-28.
First, Justices Brennan and Blackmun refused to accept traffic safety and aesthetics as
an adequate justification for upholding the ordinance, absent a strong showing by the
city that billboards substantially contributed to those messages. Id. The Justices found
the ordinance overbroad regarding traffic safety because the on-site exception permitted
signs not visible from any point on the boundary of the premises, yet excluded signs not
visible from the streets but visible from some point on the boundary of the premises. Id.
at 528-30. With respect to the city's aesthetic interest, the Justices maintained that this
asserted goal was so susceptible to being illusory that a reviewing court should require
the city to show its earnestness by demonstrating that it had engaged in a comprehen-
sive effort, including a wide range of legislative controls of other aesthetic nuisances, to
improve the unattractive environment in commercial and industrial areas. Id. at 529-
33.
Second, applying their own test to the total ban, the Justices maintained that if the
city could substantiate its asserted goals in legislating a total prohibition, it could enact
content-based exemptions discriminating against noncommercial speech if the excep-
tions directly further an interest at least as important as the interest underlying the total
ban, if the exceptions were not overbroad with respect to their asserted goals, and if the
exceptions were narrowly drawn so as to minimize their constraint of the goals underly-
ing the total ban. Id. at 532 n.10. Without deciding this question, the Justices specu-
lated that an "identification of premises" exception would pass constitutional muster.
Third, Justices Brennan and Blackmun rejected the plurality's "bifurcated approach"
of testing legislation separately with respect to its effect on noncommercial and commer-
cial speech. Id. at 534-40. In their view, this approach would result in legislation
framed in the vague terms of commercial and noncommmercial speech, thus leaving
city officials with wide discretion to control the exercise of free expression and leaving
commercial advertisers with a convenient device to escape regulation.
Justice Stevens, partially dissenting, also construed the San Diego ordinance as a total
prohibition, but reached the opposite result. Id. at 540. In his view, appellants lacked
standing to challenge the on-site prohibition because the likelihood that the ordinance
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for future review, it failed to resolve two significant issues. Having
would have a significant impact on the users of on-site signs was purely speculative. Id.
at 542-48. Proceeding to the issue of the validity of the off-site prohibition, Justice
Stevens agreed with the plurality's holding that traffic safety and aesthetics were facially
sufficient substantial governmental interests but rejected the plurality's analysis of the
exemptions to prohibition. Id. at 540-43. According to Justice Stevens, the constitu-
tionality of the San Diego ordinance's total ban depended on the resolution of two ques-
tions. First, was there any indication that the ordinance was viewpoint biased-not
merely content based discriminatorily against noncommercial speech-or that it was in
actuality a tool implemented to control topics of public discourse? Second, are remain-
ing forums of expression adequate to meet the communicative needs of billboard users?
Finding no hint of bias or censorship, and seeing no reason to believe that the overall
communicative market in San Diego would not meet billboard users' communicative
needs, Justice Stevens found no constitutional violation in the ordinance. Id. at 552-53.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger took a different position, stating
that characterizing the ordinance as either a total prohibition with content-based ex-
emptions or as a time, place, and manner restriction was inconsequential. Id. at 557-63.
In Chief Justice Burger's view, the relevant judicial inquiry as to any billboard regula-
tion should be limited to whether the enacting body narrowly legislated in response to
legitimate governmental goals, whether the restriction imposed left alternative means of
expression, and whether the legislation was viewpoint-neutral in that it did not attempt
to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its view. Id.
at 561. In accord with Justice Stevens and the plurality, the Chief Justice agreed that
traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental interests that are directly fur-
thered by billboard regulation. Id. at 560. Like Justice Stevens, the Chief Justice found
adequate remaining modes of expression and found no implication of viewpoint bias.
Id. at 562-63. Finally, the Chief Justice rejected the plurality's comparative approach
with respect to impingement of commercial speech as against noncommercial speech,
concluding that the ordinance withstood a first amendment scrutiny. Id. at 567-68.
Moreover, Chief Justice Burger was most concerned with the throttling effect he per-
ceived the plurality decision would have on the ability of local governments to mitigate
the dangers inherent in billboard advertising. Id. at 561. As Chief Justice Burger
viewed the plurality decision, local governments were left with two unsatisfactory alter-
natives: (1) exempt noncommercial signs from all regulation, or (2) prohibit billboards
entirely. Id. at 556. Indeed, viewing the plurality opinion with any imagination would
leave local governments with only the first choice.
Justice Rehnquist, in the final dissenting opinion, generally subscribed to the views of
Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Burger. In his short and rather uninformative opin-
ion, Justice Rehnquist agreed that an aesthetic justification for billboard regulation is
facially substantial and that the exemptions to the total ban in the San Diego ordinance
did not render the ordinance invalid. Id. at 569-70.
In summary, seven Justices found that the asserted aesthetic goal was sufficient on its
face. Six Justices agreed that the asserted traffic safety goal was equally sufficient. Five
Justices rejected the plurality's comparative analysis of the statute's effect on noncom-
mercial versus commercial speech. Four Justices agreed that outdoor advertising com-
panies have standing to assert the first amendment rights of all billboard users provided
that they show that clients have conveyed a substantial amount of noncommercial infor-
mation on their billboards. Four Justices seriously questioned the validity of the federal
Highway Beautification Act. Stated with some reservation, four Justices agreed that a
total billboard ban is valid when adequate alternate means of expression remain, four
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construed the San Diego ordinance as something less than a total ban
on outdoor advertising, the plurality did not decide whether total pro-
hibition could withstand constitutional scrutiny.68 The plurality also
did not address the validity of the Federal Highway Beautification
Act.69 The Act requires states to prohibit billboards in areas adjacent
to interstate and primary highways constructed with federal funds.70
Although the Act permits on-site commercial billboards in areas where
it does not permit billboards conveying noncommercial messages,
thereby contravening the Metromedia decision,71 the plurality distin-
guished the Act from Metromedia. Because the Act gives local author-
ities power to regulate billboards on lands adjacent to highways zoned
as commercial under state law or commercially unzoned areas, 72 the
Act was not subject to an overbreadth attack. Those areas left to local
control, the Court stated, may represent the only areas where substan-
tial noncommercial billboard advertising Occurs. 7 3
impliedly disagreed, and one avoided the issue altogether. Special reservation lies in the
fact that the Court arguably split equally on the issue of whether the San Diego ordi-
nance was a total prohibition. No more than two Justices agreed on any other issue or
mode of analysis as to particular problems.
68. In a footnote, however, the plurality cited Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephriam,
452 U.S. 61 (1981), a case invalidating a borough ordinance that imposed a total ban of
live entertainment, and intimated that a total ban would be unconstitutional. See Me-
tromedia, 453 U.S. at 515 n.20.
Three states maintain statewide bans on billboards that, as yet, have not faced consti-
tutional challenges. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. titl. 23, § 1901 (1980); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 264-71, 455-111 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 488 (1973).
69. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1982).
70. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510 n.16. See C. FLOYD & P. SHEDD, HIGHWAY
BEAUTIFICATION: THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT'S GREATEST FAILURE (1979)
for a summary of the history and substance of the Act and a pessimistic view of its
efficacy as a tool for aesthetic improvement.
71. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 510 n.16. The Act provides that signs located
outside of urban areas and visible from the main traveled way of the interstate system
shall be limited to directional and official signs and notices, signs advertising the sale or
lease of property upon which they are located, signs advertising activities conducted on
the property on which they are located, landmark signs, and signs advertising the distri-
bution of free coffee by nonprofit organizations to individuals traveling on the interstate
system or the primary system. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c).
72. 23 U.S.C. § 131(c)(d).
73. Metromedia, 453 at 510 n.16. As the plurality stated: "Whether, in fact, the
distinction is constitutionally significant can only be determined on the basis of a record
establishing the actual effect of the Act on billboards conveying noncommercial
messages." Id. at 515 n.20.
To date, the Act remains unchallenged. For some insight into why the Act remains
unchallenged, see C. FLOYD & P. SHEDD, supra note 70, at 77-90. The authors state:
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III. TAXPA YERS FOR VINCENT: THE AESTHETIC INTEREST
CONFIRMED
The Supreme Court, in Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent,74 reaffirmed Metromedia's fourth rule set out above. The
Court held that an asserted interest in preserving aesthetic beauty justi-
fied a content-neutral ban of outdoor advertising.7 5 The Court assessed
the constitutionality of a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibits posting
handbills or signs on public property.76 Supporters of a political candi-
date challenged the validity of the ordinance when the city removed
signs they had posted.7 7 Claiming unjustified infringement of free ex-
pression, plaintiffs lost at trial but won on appeal.7 ' The city appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, initially outlined the trial
court's finding of facts and conclusions of law. The lower court had
found that: (1) the proliferation of illegally posted signs in Los Angeles
constituted a clutter and visual blight; and (2) the posting of profes-
sionally printed political signs would exacerbate the blight and en-
courage the practice of illegally posting unattractive signs. 79 Justice
Stevens held the ordinance was a time, place and manner restriction.80
The year 1965 marked the passage of the ... Act, known to some as the Lady-
bird Johnson Bill and to others as the Billboard Baron's Financial Relief Act. The
Act was conceived with lofty intentions-to expand the Bonus Law to make bill-
board control mandatory in all the states, and to extend this control to the primary
system (most U.S.-numbered and some state-numbered highways). What emerged
offers a classic case of a powerful industry gutting environmental legislation.
Id. at 77. Thus, the significance of the issue is questionable in first amendment terms.
74. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
75. Id. at 2130. Thus, the Court explicitly rejected the comprehensive scheme for
determining the validity of aesthetic justifications that Justice Brennan established in his
Metromedia concurrence. See supra note 67.
76. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.04. The entire text of the ordi-
nance appears at 104 S. Ct. 2122.
77. See 104 S. Ct. at 2122. Candidates Outdoor Graphics Services, the company
that supplied the Vincent supporters with the removed signs, joined as co-plaintiff in the
action. Id. Plaintiffs named the city, the Director of the Bureau of Street Maintenance
and members of the City Council as defendants; plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, and
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 2122-23.
78. Id. at 2123-24. The appellate court invalidated the ordinance after holding that
the city had failed to prove the sincerity of its asserted aesthetic purpose by demonstrat-
ing that the city was engaging in a comprehensive effort to curb visual blight. Id. at
2124.
79. Id. at 2123.
80. Id. at 2130-32.
19861
Washington University Open Scholarship
352 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 30:333
He then applied the Central Hudson Gas test to determine the ordi-
nance's constitutionality. The issues were: (1) whether the city's as-
serted aesthetic interest was substantial; (2) whether the ordinance
directly advanced that interest; and (3) whether the ordinance consti-
tuted the least restrictive means of accomplishing the aesthetic goal.8 '
Justice Stevens held that the city had a substantial interest in regu-
lating posted temporary signs. 82 In accord with the Metromedia plu-
rality, he then held that because prohibition of temporary sign-posting
on public property was the only means to prevent blight, the ordinance
was sufficiently necessary and narrowly tailored to effectuate the aes-
thetic goal.83
Thus, the Court held that when a municipality proves84 that a me-
dium of expression constitutes an aesthetic harm, the municipality con-
stitutionally may prohibit use of the medium in any zoning district8" if
alternative means of expression remain open. In the context of prohib-
iting public sign-posting, the Court determined that expression through
handbill distribution, picketing or sign-posting on private property re-
mained open as means of expression. 86 Moreover, the Court stated
that the nuisance political posters pose overrides the need to preserve
accessibility to an inexpensive medium of expression like sign-post-
ing.87 Finally, the Court explicitly held that a government can prohibit
a medium of expression without establishing a compulsive beautifica-
tion scheme for an area.88
81. Id. at 2129.
82. Id. at 2130-31. Justice Stevens explained that, unlike handbills that municipali-
ties may not subject to prohibition based upon aesthetic concerns, temporarily posted
signs like billboards constitute visual blight in themselves. Id. at 2131-32.
83. Id. at 2130-32.
84. Id. at 2128 n.22. The Court stated: "The fact that the ordinance is capable of
valid application does not necessarily mean that it is valid as applied to these litigants.
We may not simply assume that the ordinance will always advance the asserted stated
interests significantly to justify its abridgement of expressive activity." Id.
85. Significantly, the Court held that temporary signs like billboards may constitute
aesthetic harm whether located in the inner-city or in rural or suburban areas. To sat-
isfy the substantial goal requirement, the municipality need only prove that the regu-
lated medium poses an aesthetic threat in itself; it need not prove that such threat is
greater than the threat posed by other aesthetically destructive eyesores. Id. at 2135.
86. Id. at 2133.
87. Id. at 2133 n.30.
88. Id. at 2130 n.25. Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined in dissent
and again asserted the need to require proof of a comprehensive effort to beautify in
order to expose impermissible legislative motives. Id. at 2141-42. Note that the major-
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IV. RECENT DECISIONS
A. Post-Metromedia First Amendment-Billboard Decisions
Eight reported cases89 have considered the first amendment-bill-
board regulation problem since the Metromedia plurality purported to
establish the "law of billboards." The following survey of these cases
reveals substantial confusion as to many of the issues raised and pur-
portedly resolved in Metromedia.
Three of the decisions9" addressed the overbreadth-standing issue
differently. In M. Callahan & Sons v. Outdoor Advertising Board,91 a
Massachusetts court of appeals denied overbreadth standing to a bill-
board company because it had not proven use of its signs for noncom-
mercial speech.92 In Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of
Arlington Heights,93 however, the Ohio Supreme Court granted over-
breadth standing, stating only that the ordinance challenged by the
commercial advertiser impinged both upon his right to communicate
and the public's right to receive political, economic, social and philo-
ity's requirement of proof that the regulated medium constitutes an aesthetic harm
serves the same exposure function, but in a less bridled fashion. The majority's ap-
proval allows the party defending the regulation to prove the regulated medium's aes-
thetic deficiencies by presenting evidence that the regulation is a part of a
comprehensive beautification scheme, thus circumstantially proving the medium to be
an aesthetic harm, as well as by presenting direct evidence to the same effect. Unfortu-
nately, however, the majority offered no explanation as to the nature or quantity of
sufficient proof.
The dissent also argued that the Los Angeles ordinance banned a medium of expres-
sion without leaving alternative means of expression. Id. at 2137.
89. Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183 (D.C. Md. 1982);
Donrey Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 200 Ark. 408, 660 S.W.2d
900 (1983); City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Adv. Ass'n, 414 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1982) (not
mentioned further due to insignificance of decision; ordinance upheld under police
power); Department of Transp. v. Shiflett, 251 Ga. 873, 310 S.E.2d 509 (1984); H & H
Operations, Inc. v. City of Peachtree City, 248 Ga. 500, 283 S.E.2d 867 (1982); R.O.
Givens, Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, 58 N.C. App. 697, 294 S.E.2d 388 (1982); Maurice
Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Bd., 12 Mass. App. Ct. 536, 427 N.E.2d
25 (1981); Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 69 Ohio
St. 2d 539, 433 N.E.2d 198 (1982).
90. Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183 (D.C. Md. 1982);
Maurice Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Advertising Board, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 536,
427 N.E.2d 25 (1981); Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 69 Ohio St. 2d 539, 433 N.E.2d 198 (1982).
91. 12 Mass. App. Ct. 536, 427 N.E.2d 25 (1981).
92. Id. at 540, 427 N.E.2d at 28.
93. 69 Ohio St.2d 539, 433 N.E.2d 198 (1982).
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sophical messages.9 4 Finally, in Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Balti-
more,9 5 the federal district court of Maryland granted overbreadth
standing to a commercial advertising company after it reviewed con-
flicting evidence as to the "substantiality" of plaintiff's noncommercial
advertising.9 6 The court stated as follows: "The exact percentages are
not known in this case, nor are they important. It seems to be con-
ceded that most of the advertisers are commercial but that there are
noncommercial ones as well." 97
Two post-Metromedia courts98 considered the validity of content-
based regulation of on-site commercial advertising and resolved the is-
sue inconsistently with Metromedia's rules. In Metromedia, Inc. v.
Mayor of Baltimore, the court invalidated a city ordinance that prohib-
ited off-site advertising and limited on-site messages identifying the oc-
cupant of the premises.99 The court's decision contravened the
Metromedia rule that classification of permissible commercial messages
need only be justified by a conceivably rational legislative choice. The
Baltimore court stated that one ground for invalidating the ordinance
was that the city did not show the ordinance was narrowly drawn to
achieve traffic safety and aesthetic concerns; for example, the ordinance
could have regulated the size and appearance of signs but not their
content.l°°
In H & H Operations, Inc. v. City of Peachtree,'1 the Supreme Court
of Georgia struck down a city ordinance that prohibited posting prices
94. Id. at 541, 433 N.E.2d at 200. Not only is the Norton court's reasoning incor-
rect under both the Metromedia analysis and prior law, it is incorrect under Taxpayers
for Vincent as well. There the Court reaffirmed the necessity of a showing of specific
imminent objective harm to parties not before the court in order to invoke the over-
breadth doctrine. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2126.
95. 538 F. Supp. 1183 (D.C. Md. 1982).
96. Id. at 1185-86.
97. Id.
98. Metromedia, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 538 F. Supp. 1183 (D.C. Md. 1982); H
& H Operations, Inc. v. City of Peachtree City, 248 Ga. 500, 283 S.E.2d 867 (1981).
99. BALTIMORE, MD., ORDINANCE no. 374 § 3(r)(a) (1977).
100. 538 F. Supp. at 1187. Thus, the court implicitly rejected the Metromedia plu-
rality's rule that when a regulation allows commercial speech, it must also allow unlim-
ited topics of noncommercial speech. Also implicit in the court's analysis is the rule
that the asserted goals of traffic safety and aesthetics must warrant the on-site content-
based distinctions as to commercial expression. Significantly, the court never reached
the question of validity of the on-site restriction in terms of its effect on commercial
expression.
101. 248 Ga. 500, 283 S.E.2d 867 (1981).
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upon on-site signs. 10 2 The court characterized the ordinance as a con-
tent-based restriction on noncommercial speech and cited Metromedia
as adopting the Central Hudson Gas test. The court then decided that
the ordinance failed to pass the second prong of Central Hudson Gas-
an ordinance must seek to implement a substantial governmental inter-
est. The court invalidated the ordinance because the governmental in-
terest in aesthetics could not reasonably be related to the prohibition of
on-site posting of prices.'0 3 Although the court's determination seems
reasonable, the Metromedia plurality adopted the Central Hudson Gas
test in validating the off-site/on-site distinction, not in analyzing the
validity of restrictions of on-site messages." °4 As noted above, such a
distinction is legitimate if it is reasonably based on a legislative deter-
mination of commercial or public interest in limiting commercial bill-
board content to specified messages.
In the most recent decision, Department of Transportation v. Shif-
lett, °5 the Supreme Court of Georgia again violated the Metromedia
principles by upholding the validity of the Georgia Outdoor Advertis-
ing Control Act of 1971." ° 6 The Act prohibits all outdoor advertising
within 660 feet of a right-of-way and visible from main roadways with
the following exceptions: (1) official traffic signs; (2) on-site signs; and
(3) signs located in either zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial
areas that provide information specifically in the interest of the travel-
ing public. 107 Despite applying the Central Hudson Gas test for con-
tent-based regulation of commercial speech,10 8 and thereby predictably
102. The ordinance limited on-site messages to premises identification and advertis-
ing of goods and services available there. Thus, the ordinance was identical to the por-
tion of the San Diego ordinance limiting on-site communications.
103. Id. at 505, 283 S.E.2d at 869-70. Noting that numbers are not aesthetically
inferior to letters of the alphabet forming words, the court cited Metromedia for the
proposition that aesthetic judgments are necessarily subjective, and therefore, must be
closely scrutinized. The court found unpersuasive the city's suggestion that prices are
particularly unappealing during price wars.
104. Moreover, the Metromedia plurality explicitly rejected the line of reasoning the
Georgia court adopted in H & H Operations. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511.
105. 251 Ga. 873, 310 S.E.2d 509 (1984).
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-6-70 (1982). The trial court, relying on Metromedia,
held that the Act violated the plaintiff's right of free expression. See 251 Ga. at 874,
310 S.E.2d at 510.
107. GA. CODE ANN. § 32-6-70.
108. Plaintiff-appellee was the owner of four billboards, all of which advertised his
own commercial interests. Therefore, although not addressed directly, plaintiff lacked
standing to challenge the statute's effect on noncommercial speech. In fact, the opinion
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validating the statute as an exercise of the state's police power to attain
traffic safety and preserve natural beauty, the court held that the Act
did not intentionally control expression, but did so indirectly while
pursuing other goals." °9 Thus, the court implicitly rejected Me-
tromedia's analysis, and should a future plaintiff have standing to chal-
lenge the statute's impingement of noncommercial expression, the
court could analyze the effect on noncommercial speech as an indirect
control of expression and not as an unlawful content-based regulation
of noncommercial speech.110
In R.O. Givens, Inc. v. Township of Nags Head,111 the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a complete prohibition of
off-site commercial advertising structures.' 12 The case is significant
because the court relied on the absence of noncommercial speech re-
strictions.113 Implicitly, the court was concerned that Metromedia
may have foreshadowed the unconstitutionality of total prohibition of
off-site commercial and noncommercial billboard communications. 114
could be read to include analysis as to the statute's effect on noncommercial speech.
251 Ga. at 874-75, 310 S.E.2d at 511.
109. The Georgia court did not rely on Metromedia in reaching its decision but
rather, relied on L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 580 (1978),
for authority. According to TRIBE, state statutes may violate freedom of expression in
two ways: (1) the direct purpose of the legislation is to control the flow of information,
or (2) the legislation may represent only an indirect restriction on the free flow of infor-
mation while pursuing other goals. Id. at 580. A statute fitting within the first category
is presumptively invalid, while a statute fitting within the second category is subject to a
balancing of the state interest against the right of speech. 251 Ga. at 874-75, 310 S.E.2d
at 511. Finding the Georgia Act to fit within the second category, the court imple-
mented the Central Hudson Gas test in lieu of Tribe's balancing test. Id. at 251 Ga. at
875, 310 S.E.2d at 511-12. The convoluted approach of the court and the arguably
misplaced reliance on academic authority in a field the Supreme Court has addressed
may again indicate the inadequacy of the Metromedia opinion.
110. The Georgia Supreme Court has become the primary detractor of Metromedia
by twice disregarding its mandates. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
111. 58 N.C. App. 697, 294 S.E.2d 388 (1982).
112. Unlike the California Supreme Court in Metromedia, the North Carolina court
construed "outdoor advertising structures" as used in the ordinance to apply only to
commercial signs. 58 N.C. App. at 701, 294 S.E.2d at 291. Unlike the village in Nor-
ton, the Town of Nags Head explicitly expressed its purpose as eliminating structures
that detract from the town's scenic beauty. Id. at 699, 294 S.E.2d at 399. The court
noted the Metromedia plurality's approval of off-site bans based on such a goal but
again made no mention of a supplemental purpose.
113. Id. at 701, 294 S.E.2d at 391.
114. Id. Note that the Florida Supreme Court in Lamar and the federal district
court in Metromedia-Baltimore showed no concern in this regard. The Givens court
found support in the Suffolk summary decision. See supra note 39.
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In Donrey Communications Co. v. City of Fayetteille,115 the
Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the validity of a city ordinance that
restricted the size of both off-site and on-site freestanding signs to a
maximum of seventy-five square feet and prescribed minimum setback
requirements.' 16 The sign ordinance's preamble established goals of
promoting safety and preserving beauty. 17 In addition, the court cited
city findings of uncontrolled proliferation of signs hazardous to users of
city streets. The finding also noted the importance of the city's aes-
thetic charm and the detrimental effect of billboards on tourism. Thus,
the court found that the asserted goals were substantial in fact and not
a pretext for purposeful impingement of the free flow in information.
Citing Metromedia, the court found the ordinance to be narrowly
drawn. "
The second part of the Donrey court's analysis raised a more contro-
versial question. The billboard owner argued that the size restriction
effectively closed the billboard forum as a channel for communication
because advertisements prepared for nationwide and statewide distri-
bution were designed for 300 square feet panels.'19 The ordinance's
seventy-five feet limit, the owner argued, would eliminate distribution
of those messages, and thus eliminate the use of the standard poster
panel as an inexpensive form of communication.12 ° The court rejected
this argument because the owner had not demonstrated that the size of
widely distributed messages could not be reduced to seventy-five square
feet without unduly increasing the cost of this medium.121
Finally, in Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Arlington
Heights,122 the Supreme Court of Ohio invalidated a village ordinance
that prohibited all off-site billboard advertising and limited on-site
115. 280 Ark. 408, 660 S.W.2d 900 (1983).
116. CITY OF FAYETTEVILLE, ARK., ORDINANCE No. 1893 (1970).
117. Id.
118. Donrey, 280 Ark. at 413, 660 S.W.2d at 903.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id., 660 S.W.2d at 903-04. This part of the Donrey opinion evidences the most
blatant inadequacy of the Metromedia decision. Two important issues remain un-
resolved: (1) what constitutes a total prohibition of billboard advertising; and
(2) whether a total prohibition is constitutional. At any rate, the Metromedia plurality
clearly would not consider the Fayetteville ordinance a total ban and presumably would
uphold its validity as a reasonable time, place and manner restriction.
122. 69 Ohio St. 2d 539, 433 N.E.2d 198 (1982).
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business.12 3 In accordance with the Metromedia plurality, the court
held that the on-site preference given commercial messages over non-
commercial messages rendered the ordinance unconstitutional. 124 The
court, however, also held that the ordinance violated the strictures of
Central Hudson Gas because the village had not offered proof support-
ing the ordinance's goals. 125
B. Post-Taxpayers for Vincent: First Amendment-Temporary and
Portable Sign Decisions
The four reported post-Taxpayers for Vincent temporary and porta-
ble sign decisions evidence continued confusion with respect to the
principles purportedly established by Metromedia and Taxpayers for
Vincent.126 Unlike the post-Metromedia billboard cases, however, the
123. VILLAGE OF ARLINGTON HEIGHTS, OHIO, ORDINANCE No. 5-1981 § 33(c);
see Norton, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 542, 433 N.E.2d at 199-200.
124. Norton, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 543, 433 N.E.2d at 200.
125. Id. The court refused to speculate as to the ordinance's purpose. Considering
the fact that seven Metromedia Justices agreed that aesthetic and traffic safety concerns
would justify an off-site prohibition coupled with an on-site limitation to premises iden-
tification, it is strange that the village's attorneys failed to even make the argument. A
dissenting judge, citing the Metromedia plurality, argued that those goals were suffi-
cient-articulated or not-as a matter of law. Id. at 547, 433 N.E.2d at 204 (Locher, J.,
dissenting).
126. Five reported decisions considered first amendment-temporary/portable sign
disputes after Metromedia and before Taxpayer for Vincent. See Dills v. City of Mari-
etta, 674 F.2d 1377 (1 lth Cir. 1982); Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv. v. City of San
Francisco, 574 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D. Cal. 1983); City of Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor
Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Rhodes v. Gwinnett County, 557 F.
Supp. 30 (N.D. Ga. 1982); City of Lakewood v. Colfax Unlimited Ass'n, 634 P.2d 52
(Colo. 1981). Each of these cases, other than City of San Francisco, resulted in the
invalidation of the challenged regulation. All of the cases addressed the aesthetic justifi-
cation issue, while only the Rhodes and Dills courts denied the existence of the asserted
aesthetic goal because the municipalities had failed to articulate sufficiently the purposes
that underlied the challenged regulations. See Rhodes, 557 F. Supp. at 32; Dills, 674
F.2d at 1381. The City of Antioch court, unlike any of the other courts, denied the
existence of an aesthetic purpose because the city failed to show an interest in maintain-
ing a comprehensive scheme of beautification. 557 F. Supp. at 60. The Rhodes and Dill
courts, however, analyzed the constitutional issues assuming arguendo that the munici-
palities had articulated the aesthetic goal.
Although the courts in each of the above cases, other than City ofAntioch, proceeded
upon the assumption that the aesthetic goal was substantial, the most common short-
coming of the challenged regulations was the failure to significantly advance the as-
serted goal. In City of Lakewood, the court invalidated, in contravention of
Metromedia, ordinances that prohibited the posting of prices or help wanted signs and
the changing of messages on nonconforming signs because the ordinances did not di-
rectly advance the asserted goals of traffic safety and aesthetics. See 634 P.2d at 64. In
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post-Metromedia temporary sign cases reveal a clear trend of invalidat-
ing regulations in favor of free expression in spite of the apparently
regulation-favoring approach of Taxpayers for Vincent. 2 7
Three of the four temporary sign cases resulted in the invalidation of
the challenged regulation. In Meros v. City of Euclid'28 the court inval-
idated an ordinance that prohibited the display of political lawn signs
but allowed "For Rent" and "For Sale" signs as accessories to the ad-
vertised residence.129 Although the court held that the ordinance vio-
lated the first amendment because the restriction preferred commercial
speech over noncommercial speech, 3 ' the court based its decision on
the city's failure to explain why political lawn signs in residential areas
posed more of a threat to safety or the community's beauty than "For
Dills, the court used the same reasoning to invalidate an ordinance that restricted by
permit the use of portable signs to a specified number of days at the expiration of which
the ordinance required removal. See 674 F.2d at 1381. In Rhodes, the court invalidated
an ordinance that limited business signs to one per premises, thus destroying the market
for portable signs. 557 F. Supp. at 33.
In two of the cases, the courts, in accord with Metromedia, found ordinances invalid
because the challenged regulations favored commercial over noncommercial speech.
See City of Lakewood, 634 P.2d at 66-69 (ordinance placed durational limits on ideolog-
ical signs but not on signs such as "For Sale"); City of Antioch, 557 F. Supp. at 56-58
(invalidated durational requirement that singled out political signs). The City of Lake-
wood court invalidated the challenged ordinance on the alternative ground that the reg-
ulation impermissibly restricted the topics of noncommercial expression to information
regarding candidates for political office. See 634 P.2d at 69. The City ofAntioch court
invalidated the challenged ordinance on the alternative ground that the 60 day dura-
tional limit on the posting of political signs, held to be insufficient for election campaign
purposes, left political supporters with inadequate means of expression. 557 F. Supp. at
59. In contrast, the City of San Francisco court upheld an ordinance that restricted
posting to 30 days and restricted posting to lamp posts and utility poles despite plain-
tiffs claim that the ordinance effectively prohibited the posting of temporary signs and
that no adequate alternative medium remained available. 574 F. Supp. at 1248.
To the extent that none of the courts in the above decisions premised their decisions
upon a factual finding of visual clutter, they acted inconsistently with Taxpayers for
Vincent. In addition, those courts that viewed time, place and manner restrictions as
not directly advancing the aesthetic goal acted inconsistently with Taxpayers for Vin-
cent. Although Taxpayers for Vincent assumed the constitutionality of a partial prohibi-
tion, that case's rationale would support any durational requirement because such a
restriction partially contributes to obliteration of visual blight. In addition, Taxpayers
for Vincent held that temporary political posters are an expendable medium of expres-
sion in view of their inherent ugliness so that any allowance for posting such signs is a
right revocable at the municipality's legislative discretion.
127. See infra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
128. 594 F. Supp. 259 (N.D Ohio 1984).
129, Id. at 262.
130. Id.
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Sale" or "For Rent" signs. 13 1
Similarly, in Matthews v. Town of Needham, 32 the court invalidated
an ordinance that limited the use of temporary and portable signs to
premises identification, notice of persons responsible for on-premises
construction and other commercial messages. 133 The court based its
decision on two grounds: (1) unlike the situation in Taxpayers for Vin-
cent, the prohibition of political sign-posting extended to private prop-
erty;134 and (2) in accord with the Metromedia plurality, the regulation
inverted the established principle that the first amendment affords non-
commercial speech greater protection than commercial speech. 3 '
Again, the court was hesitant to apply the Metromedia bifurcated
analysis.
13 6
In Dills v. Cobb County,137 the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia invalidated an ordinance that required portable sign
users to position their signs behind the premise's building set-back
line.138 Having found initially that the regulation failed to advance
traffic safety 139 and that the regulation was effectively a prohibition of
portable sign use, " the court held that the ordinance was invalid be-
cause the county had failed to show that portable signs were more aes-
thetically displeasing than permanent advertising structures not
similarly regulated.14' Thus, the court ignored the mandate of Me-
tromedia and Taxpayers for Vincent that piecemeal sign regulations can
be valid although not part of a comprehensive rehabilitation project.
Finally, in White House Vigil v. Clark,'42 the Court of Appeals for
131. Id. The court appears to have applied equal protection analysis in the name of
first amendment analysis. The significance therein is that the court failed to explicitly
apply Metromedia's bifurcated analysis.
132. 596 F. Supp. 932 (D. Mass. 1984).
133. Id. at 935.
134. Id. at 934.
135. Id. at 935.
136. Id. The court was so uneasy about relying solely upon the "inversion" princi-
ple that embodies the Metromedia bifurcated-comparative approach that the court also
relied upon the Taxpayers for Vincent Court's "apparent willingness" to extend special
protection to political speech. Id.
137. 593 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
138. Id. at 175.
139. Id. at 173.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 174.
142. 746 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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the District of Columbia upheld National Park Service (Service) regu-
lations restricting political demonstrations on the sidewalks bordering
the White House lawn. 143 Although the court upheld most of the chal-
lenged regulations on the basis of governmental interest in national se-
curity, 144 the court also upheld as aethetically justified a regulation
that prohibits stationary display of portable signs within the "center
zone"' 145 of the White House sidewalk. Specifically, the court of ap-
peals upheld the "center zone" regulation on the ground that the re-
striction directly advanced the Service's substantial aesthetic interest in
preserving White House cultural charm and beauty for tourists.14 6
The court concluded that the "center zone" restriction left ample space
and means for alternative means of expression. 147 Finally, the court of
appeals noted that the regulations were part of a comprehensive White
House beautification scheme. 148
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, post-Metromedia billboard decisions illustrate the inad-
equacy of the Metromedia opinion; most of the lower court decisions
reject the tenants Metromedia purported to establish. Most notably,
the lower courts seem to have rejected the plurality's method of analyz-
ing on-site preference of specified commercial messages. Moreover,
only one lower court has explicitly adopted the plurality's "bifurcated"
approach of analyzing a statute's effect on commercial and noncom-
mercial speech separately. 4 9 Additionally, Metromedia's failure to de-
fine what degree of legislative restriction constitutes a total ban of
143. See id. at 1538. The regulations include provisions governing the construction,
size and placement of signs displayed on the sidewalk as well as a provision requiring
that any such sign be in constant physical contact with a person. Id. at 1522. In addi-
tion, the regulations provide that a sign must not be in contact with the White House
fence bordering the sidewalk or with any structure on the sidewalk. Id.
144. Id. at 1532-34. The intent underlying the regulations is to prevent the effective
conversion of signs from means of communication to weapons directed at harming the
White House or the Presidential family. Id.
145, Id. at 1534. The center zone of the sidewalk is the twenty foot span that com-
prises the longitudinal center of the sidewalk. Id.
146. Id. at 1534-35.
147. Id. at 1537.
148. Id. at 1538. This scheme provided additional proof that the Service's aesthetic
goal was sincere.
149. Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 69 Ohio St.
2d 539, 433 N.E.2d 198 (1982).
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billboard advertising, and its failure to determine whether a total ban is
ever permissible, have left lower courts to decide these issues indepen-
dently. Presently, it appears that legislators must rely on local deci-
sions to forecast the first amendment validity of their billboard
legislation. Certainly, Metromedia provides minimal guidance at
best. 15
0
Thus far, courts have not zealously protected individual freedom of
expression at the expense of municipal power to regulate billboard ad-
vertising. On the other hand, post-Metromedia temporary and porta-
ble sign decisions reflect a clear trend favoring free expression over
governmental regulation, a trend easily adaptable to billboard regula-
tions. Specifically, the lower courts' refusal, in both billboard and tem-
porary sign disputes, to allow municipalities to legislate disparately for
different categories of commercial speech evidences a general intent by
courts to review such regulations with care. 51  Again, courts have
done so despite Metromedia's pronouncement that legislative limita-
tions among categories of commercial speech need only be a reasonable
governmental decision on behalf of either the business community or
the general public. In addition, the combination of a relaxed over-
breadth standard and the rule that commercial speech may not receive
preference over noncommercial speech provides reviewing courts with
an effective means of checking legislative abuse.
Finally, Taxpayers for Vincent resolves any doubt that a proven aes-
150. A recent Supreme Court decision provides guidance with respect to the defini-
tion of commercial speech.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983), the Court held
that a manufacturer of contraceptives that proposed to mail to the public unsolicited
advertisements, including informational pamphlets promoting its products, but also dis-
cussing disease and family planning, proposed to engage in protected commercial
speech. The Court held that a communication, notwithstanding the inclusion therein of
discussion of important public issues, constitutes commercial speech when three ele-
ments are present in the message conveyed: (1) an advertisement, (2) referring to a
specific product, (3) which is economically motivated. Id. The Court was quick, how-
ever, to add two significant caveats. First, if the advertisement refers to an activity itself
protected by the first amendment, such as advertisement for the sale of a religious trea-
tise, a different conclusion may be appropriate. Second, each of the three elements de-
scribed above need not necessarily be present in order for speech to be commercial. In
particular, the Court expressed no opinion as to whether reference to any particular
product or service is a necessary element of commercial speech. Id. at 2963.
151. White House Vigil v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For example, the
court stated: "Arbitrariness or capriciousness in the selection of aesthetic goals may
indicate the presence of an impermissible motive either to enact the preferences of indi-
vidual government officials or to burden unreasonably the exercise of free speech." Id.
at 1536.
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thetic purpose, whether or not legislatively articulated, will justify rea-
sonable time, place or manner restrictions. Because no lower court has
invalidated a billboard ordinance solely on the aesthetics issue, how-
ever, Taxpayers for Vincent provides little solace for legislators, attor-
neys and reviewing courts dealing with billboard regulations.
Moreover, as the post-Taxpayers for Vincent cases demonstrate, the
Supreme Court's confirmation of aesthetic justification often provides
no assurance to legislators that their reliance on an asserted aesthetic
goal will insulate their legislation from a constitutional challenge.
Brad Sanders*
* J.D. Washington University School of Law, 1985.
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